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REINSTATEMENT: A REMEDY FOR AN
EMPLOYER'S VIOLATION OF A HANDBOOK

OR WRITTEN EMPLOYMENT POLICY
Kurt S. Decker*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Few areas of the law are as complex or as volatile -as employment law, a bewildering maze of often conflicting statutes, common
law doctrines, contract-established rules and administrative agency
edicts. Moreover, the applicable law can vary considerably depending on the forum.
The impact of the conflict between labor and management on
our economic and social structure makes employment law one of the
most political of legal areas. Judicial and legislative decisions in this
area reflect the shifting balance of economic forces between employer and employee, a shift which has also affected the rights of at
will employees.1
At will employment refers to a relationship which allows termination of employment without cause by either party.2 Recently,
* B.A., Thiel College; M.P.A., The Pennsylvania State University; J.D., Vanderbilt Uni-

versity; L.L.M. (Labor), Temple University; Stevens & Lee, Reading, Pennsylvania; Member
Pennsylvania Bar.
This article was suggested by David F. Weiner of Gallo, Weiner & Coletta, Pittsburgh,

'Pennsylvania and for this I extend my appreciation.
I. For a discussion of the labor movement in the United States, see 1 THE

DEVELOPING
LABOR LAW 1-66 (2d ed. 1983). See also Huge & McCarthy, Collective Bargaining in the

1980's-Comments and Observations, 1 HOFSTRA LAB. L.F. 23 (1983).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 442 (1958) refers to at will employment as
follows:
Unless otherwise agreed, mutual promises by principal and agent to employ and to
serve create obligations to employ and to serve which are terminable upon notice by
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courts and legislatures have created certain exceptions to the tradi-

tional at will employment relationship, based on public policy limitations 3 or the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing which
exists in every employment relationship.4 Despite wide-spread criticism, 5 some jurisdictions still remain faithful to the traditional at
either party; if neither party terminates the employment, it may terminate by lapse
of time or by supervening events.
3. These "public policy" exceptions permit employees to bring actions for wrongful discharge, and therefore limit the at will employment concept when motivation for the firing cuts
against public policy. See generally Note, Protecting Employees At Will Against Wrongful
Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931 (1982).
Courts in at least sixteen jurisdictions have recognized a judicially created public policy
exception to at will employment. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d
1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427
A.2d 385 (1980); Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54 (1977);
Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 IIl. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Frampton v. Central Ind.
Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Murphy v. City of Topeka-Shawnee County
Dep't of Labor Servs., 6 Kan. App. 2d 488, 630 P.2d 186 (1981); Firestone Textile Co. v.
Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1982); Adler v. American Standard Corp., 290 Md. 615, 432
A.2d 464 (1981); Siles v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 13 Mass. App. Ct. 354, 433 N.E.2d 103
(1982); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976); Monge v. Beebe
Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974); Lally v. Copygraphics, 85 N.J. 668, 428
A.2d 1317 (1981); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975); Reuther v. Fowler &
Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 23, 386 A.2d 119 (1978); Krystad v. Lau, 65 Wash. 2d 817,
400 P.2d 72 (1965); Harless v. First. Nat'l Bank, 162 W. Va. 116, 246 S.E.2d 270 (1978).
Courts in at least nine jurisdictions, including the District of Columbia, have indicated
that they might adopt the public policy exception to at will employment under appropriate
facts and circumstances. Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (Ct. App.
1977); M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681 (1980); Lampe v. Presbyterian
Medical Center, 41 Colo. App. 465, 590 P.2d 513 (1978); Ivy v. Army Times Pub. Co., 428
A.2d 831 (D.C. 1981) (dissenting opinion); Abrisz v. Pulley Freight Lines, 270 N.W.2d 454
(Iowa 1978); Kenneally v. Orgain, 186 Mont. 1, 606 P.2d 127 (1980); Mau v. Omaha Nat'l
Bank, 207 Neb. 308, 299 N.W.2d 147 (1980); K.W.S. Mfg., Inc., v. McMahon, 565 S.W.2d
368 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Jones v. Keogh, 137 Vt. 562, 409 A.2d 581 (1979); Ward v. FritoLay, Inc., 95 Wis. 2d 372, 290 N.W.2d 536 (Ct. App. 1980).
Six jurisdictions have specifically rejected a judicially created public policy exception to at
will employment. Bender Ship Repair, Inc. v. Stevens, 379 So. 2d 594 (Ala. 1980); Catania v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 381 So. 2d 265 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Goodroe v. Georgia Power
Co., 148 Ga. App. 193, 251 S.E.2d 51 (1978); Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So. 2d
874 (Miss. 1981); Dockery v. Lampart Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 393, 244 S.E.2d 272, appeal
denied, 295 N.C. 465, 246 S.E.2d 215 (1978); Whittaker v. Care-More, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 395
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).
4. See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917
(1981); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 11 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
5. For an extensive list see Decker, At-Will Employment: A Proposalfor Its Statutory
Regulation, I HOFSTRA LAB. L.F. 187 n.8 (1983). See also J. KAUFF & M. MCCLAIN (co-ch),
UNJUST

DISMISSAL

(1984); L.

LORBER,

1984-EVALUATING,

J.

KIRK,

K.

LITIGATING,

KIRSCHNER,

SETTLING

C. HANDORF,

AND

AVOIDING

FEAR OF FIRING

CLAIMS

(1984); H. PER-

RiTr, JR.. EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE (1984); A. WESTIN, WHISTLEILOWING,
LOYALTY AND DISSENT (1980); Decker, At-Will Employment in Pennsylvania-A Proposal

For Its Abolition and Statutory Regulation, 87 DICK. L. REV. 477 (1983); Decker, Federal
Regulation of At-Will Employment, U. Dar. J. URB. L(1984); Flaxman, Employment
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will employment concept.8
Documents such as handbooks and employment policies7 have

increasingly influenced the at will employment relationship.8 Handbooks and other printed employment policies are used by employers

to communicate with their employees on a variety of subjects, including work rules, discipline policies, wages, and fringe benefits.
Courts have in certain circumstances considered these employer
communications to be binding commitments. 9 Because of this judicial attitude, the remedies granted to successful wrongful termina-

tion litigants have become noteworthy. Reinstatement, a remedy
generally considered unavailable in the past, deserves serious

consideration." °
For many years, arbitrators have considered reinstatement to be

an acceptable remedy for an unjustified termination arising under a
collective bargaining agreement." If handbooks and published employment policies are deemed to be binding employer commitments,
they will have the same effect as a collective bargaining agreement.
Consequently, employers must now carefully review their materials

in order to limit their liability.
This article examines the extent to which reinstatement may le-

gitimately be regarded by the courts as a remedy in wrongful termination actions arising under handbooks and written employment
policies.
II.

HANDBOOKS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICIES

Employers are aware that negotiations with unions over the
Manuals in Pennsylvania-Contract or Unenforceable Gratuity, 21 THE PHILA. LAW. 1
(1984); St. Antoine, You're Fired, 10 HuM. RTs. 32 (1982); Comment, Wrongful Dischargeof
Employees Terminable At Will-A New Theory of Liability in Arkansas, 34 ARK. L. REV.
729 (1981); Note, The Role of Federal Courts in Changing State Law: The Employment At
Will Doctrine in Pennsylvania, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 227 (1984). Additionally, law firms have
begun warning their clients regarding exceptions to the at will employment relationship. See
112 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) News and Background Information 148 (February 21, 1983).
6. These are the jurisdictions which do not subscribe to judicially created exceptions to
the traditional at will employment concept. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
7. In this article, the term "employment policy" is used to refer to any written materials
disseminated or conspicuously posted by the employer, but which are less formal than the term
"handbook" would connote.
8. If courts continue to find that handbooks and employment policies are binding commitments, the purpose of the at will employment relationship will be defeated. Employers will
no longer be able to hire and fire employees at will. See infra note 31.
9. See cases cited infra note 31.
10. See, e.g., 0. FAIRWEATHER, PRACTICE & PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION 499500 (1983).
11. Id.
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terms and conditions of collective bargaining agreements will result
in enforceable contracts. Consequently, employers are very careful
about what rights are given up to the unionized employees and what
rights are retained by the employer. However, employers have always enjoyed considerable unilateral discretion when dealing with
non-union employees. Statements in handbooks and other printed
materials were general guidelines regarding conduct that would be
subject to withdrawal, modification, exceptions, or interpretation at
any time by the employer.12 Courts are now consistently finding
these statements to be binding contracts. 13
As a result, employers should now regard these materials in the
same manner as collective bargaining agreements, that is, as binding
commitments. 4 An aggressive stance may in fact benefit an employer with a nonunion workforce. By making employees aware that
the employer regards the policies as binding commitments, the employer may deter or prevent employees from organizing. 15 It can be
particularly effective if the terms and conditions equal or exceed
what employees could gain from a collective bargaining agreement
and a union organizing campaign. If the provisions in a handbook
are perceived as fair by the employees, the employer may be able to
avoid or deter unionization. However, the same considerations create
additional pressure for employers and courts to deal with a reinstatement remedy when faced with a wrongful termination case.
A. A General View of Handbooks and Employment Policies
Handbooks and employment policies gained importance as large
organizations became more common, and a system of rules became
essential for orderly and efficient employer functioning. 16
12. See cases cited infra note 30.
13. See cases cited infra note 31.
14. See Reviewing the Employee Handbook, HUM. RESOURCES MGMT. (CCH) No. 61
(March 23, 1984).
15. Handbooks that contain some form of job protection counteract the most important

reason for employees to unionize. The value to an employee of job security and the power to
appeal employer determinations should not be underestimated by an employer. See St. Antoine, supra note 5, at 35.
16.

See A. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERI-

CAN BUSINESS 7 (1977).

At any one time, the rights and duties of workers and of managers, indeed of all
those in the hierarchy, must be established and understood by all those involved in
the hierarchy ....
The industrial system creates an elaborate "government" at the
work place and work community. It is often said that primitive societies have extensive rules, customs, and taboos, but a study of the industrial society reflects an even
greater complex and a different set of detailed rules.
C. KERRY, J. DUNLOP. F. HARBISON, C. MYERS, INDUSTRIALISM AND INDUSTRIAL MAN 41
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Employers with a small number of employees can usually operate without articulated rules. When the employment force is small,
activities can be individually directed.17 However, when there are
many employees, individualized decision making becomes impractical because the number of employment decisions that must be made
exceeds the ability of one person to make them.18 Delegation of the
decision making authority to lower-level employees creates the risk
of inconsistency.19
Employers with a large number of employees often use formal
rules to explain policy to employees and to reduce the number of
individual unilateral decisions. Rules are promulgated with respect
to operations, procurement, capital investment, accounting, and public relations. Policies control supervisory discretion regarding time
off, compensation, and other benefits, as well as promotions and
discipline.2"
Handbooks and employment policies are useful in promoting order. These materials standardize employee production and provide
standards for employer instructions without depending on often inconsistent individual communication through supervisory personnel.
However, to achieve the predictability and order for which they were
designed, these standards must be applied uniformly.21 By reducing
the opportunity for arbitrary supervisory action, established policies
may enhance employee perception of employer fairness. 2 When used
with internal procedures for appealing adverse supervisory actions,
handbooks and written employment policies can promote the concept
23
that employees are treated with respect and concern.
Handbooks and employment policies usually outline: (1) rules of
expected employee behavior; (2) disciplinary or termination procedures if those rules are violated; (3) compensation; and (4) benefit
(1960).
17.

H. PERRiTT, JR., supra note 5, at 306.

18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 306-07.
Id. at 307.
Id.
Id. at 309.

22.

Id.

23. Id. To deal with the erosion of the at will employment relationship, many employers
have instituted internal mechanisms for resolving employee complaints. Some have also agreed
in advance to arbitrate employee claims. Employers have adopted dispute-resolution systems
that range from the very informal to systems that are as formal as those typically found in

collective bargaining agreements. These systems are commonly referred to as: (1) open door;
(2) formal appeal to management; and (3) arbitration. For an in-depth discussion of these
systems see C.

BAKALY, JR. & J. GROSSMAN, MODERN LAW OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS:

FORMATION, OPERATION AND REMEDIES FOR BREACH

169-79 (1983).'
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items regarding hours of work, overtime, lay-off, recall, health care
insurance, pensions, leaves of absence, holidays and vacations. Often,
they are the only vehicle for the employer to set forth these policies,
and are commonly intended to create a cooperative relationship between employer and employees by establishing and fostering
communication.
Employers' handbooks and employment policies vary. They reflect the employer's particular operational and management style.
However, handbooks and employment policies must also reflect the
current law.2 4 Therefore, they must be carefully and regularly reviewed by employers in order to limit improper employer actions.
B.

Handbooks and Employment Policies: Binding and NonBinding Contracts

For years, courts supported the traditional view that handbooks
and employment policies did not affect the employee's at will status.
These materials were considered to be unenforceable unilateral employer expressions, lacking definiteness, mutuality and consideration.2 5 Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co.,26 exemplifies this view
of employer generated material. In Johnson, a handbook provision
provided that termination could not occur without "just cause. 27 Al24. Because some state courts have found that handbooks and employment policies are
in certain circumstances binding contractual commitments, they should be reevaluated with
this in mind. See cases cited infra note 31. Furthermore, since laws regulating overtime, vacation pay and jury duty, etc., may vary from state to state, such state laws must be considered
in formulating employer policy. For example, state legislatures have also provided some protection for at-will employees. Several states have statutes prohibiting discharges based upon political activity. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 56, § 33 (West 1975). For a collection of
state laws regarding firing for political activity, see 1984, LAB. L. REP. (CCH) (State Laws)
43,045. Some states prohibit discharges because of physical handicaps. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 12940(a) (West 1981); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151(b), § 4 (16) (West Supp. 1985);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03, Subd. 1(2) (West Supp. 1981). A few states, for example, Idaho,
Massachusetts, Michigan, North Dakota, and Vermont, do not permit employers to take action against employees for serving as jurors or for indicating their availability as jurors. For a
collection of state laws regarding termination for serving on a jury, see 1984 LAB. L. REP.
(CCH) (State Laws) 1 43,035. Other states, for example, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Washington, prohibit
termination for refusing to take a lie detector test. For a collection of relevant state laws, see
1984 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) (State Laws) 1 43,035. Another common provision in state laws is a
prohibition against retaliatory termination for filing a workers' compensation claim. See, e.g.,
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1980). See also M. SOVERN, LEC.AL
RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ch. 3 (1966); Bonfield, The Substance of American Fair Employment Practices Legislation I: Employers, 61 Nw. U.L. RaV.
907 (1967).
25. See cases cited infra note 31. See also Flaxman, supra note 5, at 10.
26. 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779 (1976).
27. Id.
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though the plaintiff claimed that the handbook provision created an
express or implied contract, the court concluded that this was only a
unilateral employer expression of policy and procedure. 28 "Its terms
were not bargained for by the parties and any benefits conferred by
it were mere gratuities . . . . [N]o meeting of the minds was evidenced by the [employer's] unilateral act of publishing [this] policy."'29 This rationale was for many years followed by the courts and
there are still a number of jurisdictions which remain faithful to the
rationale expressed in Johnson, and reject the argument that handbooks and employment policies may indeed bind the employer.30
However, courts in other jurisdictions have held that statements
made in handbooks and employment policies create binding employer commitments.31 For example, in Toussaint v. Blue Cross &
28. Id. at __, 551 P.2d at 782.
29. Id.
30. Handbooks and employment policies have been found to be non-binding in the following states: Alabama-White v. Chelsea Indus., Inc., 425 So. 2d 1090 (Ala. 1983); Delaware-Heideck v. Kent General Hosp. Inc., 446 A.2d 1095 (Del. 1982); Indiana--Shaw v.
S.S. Kresge Co., 167 Ind. App. 1, 328 N.E.2d 775 (1975); Louisiana-Williams v. Delta Haven, Inc., 416 So. 2d 637 (La. Ct. App. 1982); Maine-Terrio v. Millinocket Community
Hosp., 379 A.2d 135 (Me. 1977); Montana--Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 196. Mont.
178, 668 P.2d 1063 (1982); New Jersey-Savarese v. Pyrene Mfg. Co., 9 N.J. 595, 89 A.2d
237 (1952); but see Petrella v. NL Indus., Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1357 (D. N.J. 1982); North
Carolina-Roberts v. Wake Forest University, 55 N.C. App. 430, 286 S.E.2d 120, pet. denied,
305 N.C. 586, 292 S.E.2d 571 (1982); Texas-Reynolds Mfg. Co. v. Mendoza, 644 S.W.2d
536 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982).
31. Handbooks and employment policies have been found in certain circumstances to be
binding contractual commitments in the following states: Arizona-Leikvold v. Valley View
Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 544, 688 P.2d 170 (1984); California-Pugh v. See's Candies,
Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981); Colorado-Salimi v. Farmers Ins.
Group, 684 P.2d 264 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984); Florida-Falls v. Lawnwood Medical Center, 427
So. 2d 361 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); but see Muller v. Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So. 2d
266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Illinois-Carter v. Kaskaskia Community Action Agency, 24
Ill. App. 3d 1056, 322 N.E.2d 574 (1974); Kentucky--Shah v. American Synthetic Rubber
Corp., 655 S.W.2d 489 (Ky. 1983); Massachusetts-Garrity v. Valley View Nursing Home,
Inc., 10 Mass. App. Ct. 822, 406 N.E.2d 423 (1980); Michigan-Toussaint v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980); Minnesota-Pine River State Bank v.
Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983); Nebraska-Morris v. Lutheran Medical Center, 215
Neb. 677, 340 N.W.2d 388 (1983); Nevada-Southwest Gas Corp. v. Ahmad, 99 Nev. 594,
668 P.2d 261 (1983); New Mexico-Vigil v. Arzola, 101 N.M. 687, 687 P.2d 1038 (1984);
New York-Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc. 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193
(1982); Ohio-Hedrick v. Center for Comprehensive Alcoholism Treatment, 7 Ohio App.3d
211, 454 N.E.2d 1343 (1982); Oklahoma-Langdon v. Saga Corp., 569 P.2d 524 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1976); Oregon-Yartzoffv. Democrat-Herald Publishing Co., 281 Or. 651, 576 P.2d 356
(1978); Pennsylvania-Banas v. Matthews Int'l, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3110 (1984); Novosel
v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983); but see Richardson v. Charles Cole
Memorial Hosp., 320 Pa. Super. 106, 466 A.2d 1084 (1983); South Dakota-Osterkamp v.
Alkota Mfg., 332 N.W.2d 275 (S.D. 1983); Tennessee-Hamby v. Genesco, Inc., 627 S.W.2d
373 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982); Washington-Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d
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Blue Shield,32 an employee was told at the time of hiring that he
would be employed as long as he did his job. This promise was supported by the handbook stating that it was the employer's policy to
terminate an employee for "just cause" only.33 These oral and written promises were found to be enforceable as an express or implied
agreement that set forth legitimate employee expectations based on
the employer's representations. 34
Toussaint has been followed in other jurisdictions. 5 The courts
have reasoned that the handbook or employment policy is the offer
of a unilateral contract; the employee expresses his acceptance of the
contract by working and consideration is the employee's continuation
of work, since he is always free to leave.36 However, the courts have
also held that such unilateral employment offers may be augmented,
modified or withdrawn unilaterally by the employer.3 7 For instance,
when an employer distributes a new handbook or employment policy,
the employer makes a new offer of employment to the at will employee. This new offer is limited to the new handbook's or employment policy's contents and becomes effective on the date it is distributed. The at will employees must again accept the new offer and
provide consideration by continuing their employment.3 8
Handbooks and employment policies have also been given legal
recognition in unemployment compensation disputes.39 In most
states, the employer has the burden of establishing that an employee
219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984).
32. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).

33.

408 Mich. at _, 292 N.W.2d at 884.

34.

Id.

35. See Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d
193 (1982); Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp., 293 Or. 96, 643 P.2d 1276 (1982). Dew v,
City of Florence, 378 S.C. 115, 303 S.E.2d 664, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 936 (1983). See also

cases cited infra note 39.
36. See, e.g., Brooks v. Trans World Airlines, 457 F. Supp. 805, 809 (D. Colo. 1983);
Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 626-27 (Minn. 1983); Arie v. Intertherm,
Inc., 648 S.W.2d 142, 152-53 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Southwest Gas Corp. v. Ahmad, 99 Nev.
594, -, 668 P.2d 261, 261-62 (1983).
37. See, e.g., Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983).

This is unlike the employer's situation under a union contract, where the employer is
prohibited from making unilateral changes without first bargaining with the union. In the
union setting, if no agreement is reached between the union and employer it is very difficult, if
not impossible, for the employer to institute change. See, e.g., Decker, Pennsylvania's Public
Employee Relations Act (Act 195) and Impasse-The Public Employer's Right to Make Unilateral Changes in Employment Conditions, 86 DcK. L. REv. 1 (1981).
38. See Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 626-27 (Minn. 1983).

39. See, e.g., James v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 59 Pa. Commw.
230, 429 A.2d 782 (1981); Lingenfelter v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 58
Pa. Commw. 52, 426 A.2d 1307 (1981).
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who seeks unemployment compensation was terminated for a deliberate or willful violation of an existing employer policy. Employers
commonly show the existence of policies upon which the discharge is
based, by proving the distribution of a handbook or written employment policy where in the rule is printed. Here, ironically, it is the
employer and not the employee who asserts that the handbook or
employment policy is a binding employment commitment.
C. Oral Employment Policies: Binding and Non-Binding
Contracts
An employer's oral promises of continued employment can support a binding commitment. In most cases in which recovery was
permitted, there was an oral promise communicated by the employer
in addition to a statement in the handbook indicating that the employee would be terminated only for cause or after dispute settlement procedures had been exhausted.40
In Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield,"1 and its companion
case, Ebling v. Masco Corp.,42 sufficient evidence was presented to
imply a contract based on assurances that termination would occur
for just cause only. 4a In Toussaint, the court found two independent
promises, either of which would have been binding,4 4 one oral,45 and
one contained in a handbook.
Other cases support the rationale that oral promises may become binding employer commitments.46 Sometimes the direct oral
promise can be clearly established. In Terrio v. Millinocket Commu40. See, e.g., Terrio v. Millinocket Community Hosp., 379 A.2d 135 (Me. 1977); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
41. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
42. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).

43. Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 599, 292 N.W.2d at 885.
44.
A provision of an employment contract providing that an employee shall not be discharged except for cause is legally enforceable . . . such a provision may become
part of the contract either by express agreement, oral or written, or as a result of an
employee's legitimate expectations grounded in an employer's policy statements.
Id. at 598, 292 N.W.2d at 885.
45. Regarding the oral promise, the court determined,
[w]hen a prospective employee inquires about job security and the employer agrees

that the employee shall be employed as long as he does the job, a fair construction is
that the employer has agreed to give up his right to discharge at will without as-

signing a cause and may discharge only for cause.
Id. at 610, 292 N.W.2d at 890.

46. See, e.g., Wiener v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457
N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1985

9

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 1
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

[Vol. 3:1

nity Hospital,47 an oral statement by the employer's agent was found
to be binding. The employee had been assured that she was secure in
[her] job "for the rest of her life," 48 and the court determined that
"the context of her long service in a position of substantial responsibility

. . .

provided the critical evidentiary support for her contract

claim."49
A number of other cases have also held that oral statements and
handbooks, when combined with other factors, may be construed as
binding promises. 50 For example, in Schipani v. Ford Motor Co.,51
the employee maintained that an oral agreement combined with a
personnel manual and employment practices was sufficient to constitute an implied contract of continued employment until age 65, even
though there was a signed written contract which stated that employment was terminable at will. The court held that the question of
whether the written contract was altered by the alleged oral and
written assurances was one for the jury to determine.5 Although an
oral contract may be unenforceable under the statute of frauds,5 3 the
54
doctrine of promissory estoppel may negate this employer defense.
Other courts have found that, in the absence of written policy
statements or collective bargaining agreements, oral promises are insufficient to constitute binding employer commitments. For example,
in Griffith v. Sollay Foundation Drilling,5" the court applied the
traditional rule that a promise of permanent employment created an
indefinite hiring, terminable at will. A former employee alleged
breach of an oral "permanent" contract after the employer terminated the employee on grounds that his services were no longer
47.
48.

379 A.2d 135, 138 (Me. 1977).
Id.

49.

Id.

50. See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981);
Cleary v. American Airlines, I l l Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
51. 102 Mich. Ct. App. 606, 302 N.W.2d 307 (1981).
52. 102 Mich. Ct. App. at -,
302 N.W.2d at 311.
53. It is the general rule that an oral contract for an indefinite term of employment is

outside the statute of frauds. See, e.g., Reynier v. Associated Dyeing & Printing Co., 116
N.J.L. 481, 184 A. 780 (1936). A contract for an indefinite period is an at will contract; i.e., it
may be terminated by either party at any time and for any cause. For this reason, the contract
is capable of being performed within one year, and is, therefore, outside the Statute of Frauds.
See, e.g., Haupt v. International Harvestor Co., 582 F. Supp. 545, 549 n.7 (N.D. I11. 1984).

Additionally, because the employee's death could terminate the contract within a year, some
courts hold that the contract could be fully performed within one year. See, e.g., Bussard v.
College of St. Thomas, 294 Minn. 215, 200 N.W.2d 155, 161 (1972).
54. Schipani v. Ford Motor Co., 102 Mich. Ct. App. 606, 302 N.W.2d 307 (1980).
55. 373 So. 2d 979 (La. Ct. App. 1979).
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needed. 56 The court held that because the contract was not for a
fixed term, and because no special consideration was given by the

agreeemployee beyond the rendering of services, the 5employment
7
ment was terminable at the will of either party.

III.
A.

REINSTATEMENT

An Overview

"Reinstatement" is commonly regarded as the restoration of an
employee to his or her former position after termination, layoff, leave
of absence or a strike.5 8 Historically, courts have resisted ordering an

employer to reinstate an employee in the absence of a statute specifically granting such a remedy. 59 As late as 1936, courts held that a

reinstatement order was unenforceable. 60 Courts indicated that the
common law did not permit specific performance of an employment
contract. Therefore, the employee would be permitted only money

damages for back pay, or for punitive damages.6 1 Several reasons
were advanced to support this view. First, because money damages
was considered an adequate remedy to fully compensate any employee for an employer wrong,6 2 equitable intervention through rein-

statement was not necessary. Furthermore, because an employment
relationship depended on employer-employee cooperation, the status

quo could not be restored.63 In addition, no practical way might exist

to supervise the employee's work so as to assure good performance.6 4
56.
57.

Id. at 980.
Id. at 982.

58.

LAB. REL EXPEDITER

(BNA) 545 (1984).

59. See Van Hecke, Changing Emphases in Specific Performance, 49 N.C.L. REV. I
(1961).
60. See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Bryant, 263 Ky. 578, 92 S.W.2d 749
(1936).
61. See, e.g., Valentine v. General Am. Credit, Inc., 123 Mich. App. 533, 332 N.W.2d
591 (1983); Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 668 P.2d 213 (Mont. 1983).
62. North Am. Co. for Life, Acc. & Health Ins. v. Boiling, 275 Ala. 457, 156 So. 2d
144 (1963); Masetta v. National Bronze & Alum. Foundry Co., 159 Ohio St. 306, 112 N.E.2d
15 (1953).
63. Rautenberg v. Westland, 227 Cal. App. 2d 566, 38 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1964).
64. For example, in De Rivafinoli v. Corsetti, 4 Paige 264, 264 (N.Y.Ch. 1833), an
employer attempted to force a "primo basso" to perform a contract "to sing, gesticulate and
recite." The Chancellor in denying specific performance stated:
I am not aware that any officer of this court has that perfect knowledge of the
Italian language, or possesses that exquisite sensibility in the auricular nerve which
is necessary to understand, and to enjoy with a proper zest the peculiar beauties of
the Italian opera. . . . There might be some difficulty, therefore, even if the defendant was compelled to sing under the direction and in the presence of a master in
chancery, in ascertaining whether he performed his engagement according to its
spirit and intent. It would also be very difficult for the master to determine what
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Finally, an employer could not get specific performance against an
employee because this would constitute involuntary servitude or employment slavery. 65 Therefore, under the mutuality of remedy theory, neither could an employee enforce a reciprocal commitment,
forcing the employer to accept the services of the employee.
Today, all of the above reasons are susceptible to closer scrutiny
in light of the general belief that it is fair to protect at will employees from wrongful termination.66 In addition, uncertain economic
conditions, 67 unsteady interest rates, 8 and fluctuating levels of excessive unemployment69 have made at will employees more concerned
with protecting their jobs.
Consequently, any request for reinstatement should not be summarily dismissed as unworkable, but should be examined according
to the facts of the particular termination. This notion of the propriety of using reinstatement as a remedy under appropriate circumstances corresponds with the general notion that at will employees
who do not possess the bargaining power equal to that of their employers may also need protection." ° For example, where a job carries
with it prestige, opportunity for personal learning, special career development, or other unique advantages, money damages may be an
inadequate remedy. It may be difficult for an employee to locate a
comparable position even if he or she prevails in a wrongful termination action. A slowdown of the economy, or the specialized nature of
a position make finding comparable employment difficult. Furthermore, a wrongfully terminated employee should not be compelled to
relocate to obtain a comparable position. Money damages cannot always totally compensate an employee for an employer wrong and are
inadequate where termination carries with it connotations of unsuitability or incompetence. A wrongful termination can injure the employee's career elsewhere, and have a lingering impact. Money dameffect coercion might produce upon the defendant's singing, especially in the livelier
airs....
65. See Stevens, Involuntary Servitude by Injunction, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 235 (1921).
66. See Decker, supra note 5, at 189.
67. 112 LAB. REL REP. (BNA), News and Background Information, 14 (Jan. 3, 1983).
68. 111 LAB. REL REP. (BNA), News and Background Information, 127 (Oct. 18,
1982).
69. 111 LAB. REL REP. (BNA), News and Background Information, 201 (Nov. 15,
1982).
70. Approximately 60% to 65% of all American employees are hired on an at will basis.
Another 22% are unionized and about 15% are federal or state employees. See U.S. Bureau of

the Census, Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1979, at 427 (table
704) (union membership); id. at 392 (table 644) (total labor force); id. at 313 (table 509);
(government employees).
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ages generally do not compensate for future harm. 1
The mutuality argument may on the surface appear fair and
reasonable, but it denies a wrongfully terminated employee continued employment, and rewards the employer by limiting liability to
money damages.
The justifications offered by the courts for denying reinstatement hardly seem adequate to justify a blanket refusal of the remedy.72 Of course, if a court were to find that an employee would not
perform adequately if reinstated, it would be justified in refusing
such a remedy. There is really no justification, however, for refusing
to consider it is as an alternative because a problem may exist in
some instances. Reinstatement has been considered a viable remedy
in other areas of employment law. In reviewing those arbitrators' decisions in which state and federal statutes have been applied, the
manner in which these arbitrators have dealt with the reinstatement
remedy under collective bargaining agreements becomes clear.
B. Statutory Exceptions PermittingReinstatement
The most common statutory exceptions which permit reinstatement for a wrongful termination are found in state civil service statutes 3 and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).71 These statutory remedies are ordinarily administrative, but they may receive
judicial enforcement. 75 In many of the cases, the problems of possible supervisory conflict or lack of employer cooperation, have been
given little or no consideration.76 For example, in one case, an employee was terminated after he challenged his supervisor to a fight.77
The court reinstated the employee and found that the employment
relationship could be renewed if the judiciary insisted upon it.78
Similar remedy provisions are found in state 9 and federal8"
71.

In the area of employment discrimination, courts have found it appropriate to award

"front pay." Front pay is similar to back pay; however, it is awarded to compensate for lost
future earnings. See, e.g., Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 292-93 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
72. For a general discussion, see D. DOMaS, REMEDIES 429-31 (1973).

73. See, e.g., PA.

STAT. ANN.

tit. 71, § 741.950 (Purdon's Supp. 1985-86). See also

Baron v. State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 8 Pa. Commw. 6, 301 A.2d 427 (1973).
74. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1980). The National Labor Relations Board may order a "reinstatement of employees with or without back pay" where employees have been terminated. Id.
75. For example, orders of the National Labor Relations Board compelling reinstatement may be enforced by the courts. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e). See, e.g., NLRB v. Fleetwood
Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967).
76. See, e.g., Department of Transp. v. Jones, 5 Pa. Commw. 263, 290 A.2d 434 (1972).
77. NLRB v. Yazoo Valley Elec. Power Ass'n, 405 F.2d 479 (5th Cir. 1968).

78. Id.
79.

See, e.g., PA.

STAT. ANN.

tit. 43, § 959(0 (Purdon's Supp. 1985-86).
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anti-discrimination laws, which may require an employer to hire an
individual or to reinstate a terminated employee to prevent discrimination. The Fair Labor Standards Act 81 authorizes reinstatement of
an employee who is terminated for claiming minimum wage benefits.82 Other federal legislation restricting the right to terminate and
permitting possible reinstatement include: (1) the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970;83 (2) the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act;8 4 (3) the Rehabilitation Act of 1973;85
(4) the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974;86 (5) the

Energy Reorganization Act of 197487 (6) the Clean Air Act;88 (7)
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act;89 (8) the Federal Railroad
Safety Authorization Act of 1980;9' (9) the Consumer Credit Protection Act; 91 (10) the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978;92 and (11)
the Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Act.93 State statutes also contain similar limitations where reinstatement could be considered as
94
an appropriate remedy.
In cases decided under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
80. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 2-3 (1980) (title VII).
81. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982).
82. 29 U.S.C. §§ 215, 217 (1982). This has been taken to mean that reinstatement may
be a proper remedy. See Mitchell v. De Mario Jewelry, 361 U.S. 288 (1960).
83. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1982) (prohibiting discrimination against an employee for
assertion of rights guaranteed under the Occupational Safety and Health Act).
84. 38 U.S.C. §§ 2021(a)(A)(i), 2021(a)(B), 2021(b)(1) (1982) (guaranteeing the right
to re-employment upon satisfactory completion of military service and prohibiting termination
"without cause" within one year after re-employment).
85. 29 U.S.C. § 796h (1982) (requiring affirmative action to advance the employment of
handicapped individuals by government contractors or subcontractors).
86. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1140-1141 (1982) (prohibits terminating employees to prevent them
from attaining vested pension rights).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (1982) (prohibits terminating employees who assist, participate, or
testify, or are about to do same, in any proceeding to carry out purposes of the Act or the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (1982) (prohibits terminating employees who commenced, caused
to commence, or testified at proceedings against employer for violation of the Act).
89. 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (1982) (prohibits termination of employees who institute or testify
at a proceeding against the employer for violation of the Act).
90. 45 U.S.C. § 441(a), (b)(1) (1982) (prohibits railroad company from terminating
employees who filed complaints, instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or
related to enforcement of federal railroad safety laws, or testified, or are about to, at such
proceeding; or who refuse to work under conditions they reasonably believe to be dangerous).
91. 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1982) (prohibits terminating employees because of garnishment of wages for any one indebtedness).
92. 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (1982) (permits removal of federal civil service employees "only
for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service").
93. 28 U.S.C. § 1875 (1982) (prohibits terminating employees for service on grand or
petit jury).
94. See supra note 24.
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1964," and the Age Discrimination and Employment Act
(ADEA), 96 courts have not been reluctant to order reinstatement.
Reinstatement has been ordered under Title VII where an employee

was terminated for taking action to enforce the provisions of Title
7
VII1 for being married,9 8 for being pregnant and unmarried, 99 and

for being overweight. 100 These courts have assumed, without discussion, that the presumption created by the Supreme Court in Al-

bemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,' 0 ' in favor of awarding back pay, applied equally to awarding reinstatement. 02
Although courts may simply "order" the employer to reinstate

the employee, occasionally a court will articulate the desired effect of
the reinstatement remedy more clearly. In Laffey v. Northwest Air-

lines, 0 3 the airline had a policy conditioning the employment of
stewardesses upon their maintaining a prescribed weight, and the

plaintiff, who exceeded that weight, was terminated. The court illustrated the distinction between prospective and compensatory relief

by issuing both a negative and an affirmative injunction. The negative injunction essentially precluded any further discriminatory activ95. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e(17) (1982). See, e.g., EEOC v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.,
346 F. Supp. 675 (N.D. Ga. 1972), afid, 475 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
854 (1973); Danner v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 447 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1971). Recent examples
include: EEOC v. Eazor Express Co., 499 F. Supp. 1377 (W.D. Pa. 1980), afid, 659 F.2d
1066 (3d Cir. 1981) (The district court ordered the employee's reinstatement at the position
she would have had in the absence of discrimination at the rate of pay she would have been
earning and with the same seniority benefits); Jones v. Trailways Corp., 477 F. Supp. 642
(D.D.C. 1979) (The court ordered reinstatement and awarded back pay, attorney's fees, and
$2,500 as compensation for humiliation and degradation); EEOC v. Lithographers, Local 2P,
412 F. Supp. 530 (D.Md. 1976) (Within the scope of equitable relief, the court granted the
claimants back pay, reinstatement, and retroactive seniority rights).
96. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982). See, e.g., Frith v. Eastern Air Lines, 611 F.2d 950
(4th Cir. 1979).
97. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1969).
98. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 991 (1971).
99. Doe v. Osteopathic Hospital, 333 F. Supp. 1357 (D. Kan. 1971).
100. Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1382 (D.D.C. 1974).
101. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
102. For example, McCormick v. Attala County Bd. of Educ., 541 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir.
1976), involved a race discrimination action in which the appellate court vacated the order and
remanded the suit to the district court. The lower court had held that the defendant school
board's policy of replacing outgoing teachers with new teachers of the same race was racially
discriminatory, but it had also denied the plaintiff, a black teacher, both reinstatement and
back pay. No grounds were stated for these denials. The appellate court noted that, once
discrimination had been proven, a presumption arose that its victim was entitled to reinstatement and back pay. Consequently, the district court was to award the requested relief unless it
found that extraordinary circumstances justified its denial.
103. 374 F. Supp. 1382 (D.D.C. 1974).
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ity by the airline based on an employee's weight. The affirmative
injunction required the airline to notify all stewardesses that the
company's weight policy would no longer be enforced, to adjust its
employment procedures accordingly, and to offer immediate reinstatement with full seniority to each stewardess who had been termi104
nated for excess weight.
Reinstatement has also been ordered to remedy age discrimination. Upon a judicial determination that an employee covered by the
ADEA has been unlawfully discriminated against by an employer,
relief in the form of "judgments compelling employment, reinstatement or promotion" may be granted where appropriate. 105 Under the
ADEA, courts may also compel employment of an unsuccessful applicant upon a finding of a wrongful refusal to hire.106
In deciding cases under the various discrimination laws, courts
have only been reluctant to order reinstatement where prolonged litigation has engendered ill will, especially where an employee has received a substantial backpay award. For example, in Cancellier v.
Federated Department Stores'07 three former executives of I.
Magnin alleged that their terminations violated the ADEA and
stated pendant state claims for breach of contract and breach of an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The jury, after a six
week trial, awarded a general verdict of $800,000, $600,000 and
$500,000 for a total of $1,900,000, plus attorneys' fees and costs of
$467,000, L 8 but the court refused to order reinstatement of the

plaintiffs, citing acrimony between them and their employer and the
104. Id.
105. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982). See, e.g., Frith v. Eastern Air Lines, 611 F.2d 950 (4th
Cir. 1979). In Babb v. Sun Co., 562 F. Supp. 491 (D. Minn. 1983), the court noted that
reinstatement is a favored remedy under the ADEA and should be denied only under "exceptional circumstances." Id. at 492. Defendant urged that front pay in lieu of reinstatement was
the better remedy, especially because some acrimony may have resulted from the course of the
litigation, but the court rejected the argument. It found that there was no "poisoned relationship" as a result of the litigation, and there was no other reason not to order reinstatement. Id.
at 493. All three plaintiffs were ordered reinstated, including one who had unsuccessfully
looked for other employment, one who had found employment with reduced benefits, and one
who had not sought other employment because he had few employable years ahead of him.
106. For example, in Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers, 703 F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1983),
the district court refused to compel the employment of the plaintiff, who had been denied a job
with the defendant solely because of her age. The court's intransigence was based on its perception of a jury verdict for the defendant as resjudicatafor the purposes of her reinstatement
claim. The Eighth Circuit saw no reason not to reinstate the plaintiff. The job sought was not
so sensitive that to hire the plaintiff would engender antagonism, nor was there such animosity
between parties that an amicable future working relationship would be impossible.
107. 672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982).
108. Id.at 1315.
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fact that plaintiffs were made "whole" by the size of the verdicts.1 0 9
C. Current Status of the Reinstatement Remedy in Wrongful
Termination Litigation
Lack of a statutory mandate should not preclude courts from
ordering reinstatement as a remedy. Prior to the 1970's and 1980's

surge of at will employment litigation, 10 there had been special situations allowing wrongfully terminated employees to be reinstated.,
In Staklinski v. Pyramid Electric Co.,"1 2 a high level executive em-

ployee had an eleven year employment contract which provided for
retirement upon disability. The employer decided that the employee
was disabled and terminated his employment. The employee invoked
the contract's provisions providing for arbitration, claiming that he
was not disabled. The arbitrators found in favor of the employee and
ordered reinstatement.11 3

Recently, some courts have renewed their interest in the reinstatement remedy by ordering it in wrongful termination cases. In
Duhon v. Slickline, Inc.,1 1 4 a father was wrongfully terminated by
his sons when the parent disapproved of one son's beard. Reinstatement was ordered. Here an employment contract that was found to
be relevant listed the father's duties and stated: "The services to be

rendered are Chairman of the Board, Advisor, and items actually
related thereto, including supervision on jobs."'' 1 5
The sons testified that the termination resulted from the father's

failure to perform job duties. Both sons further testified that their
father had been disturbed about one son's beard. According to the
sons, the father flatly refused to do any sales work until the beard
was removed.
109. The Court of Appeals explained that:
[t]he trial judge in this case denied reinstatement because he found evidence of
acrimony in the record and because he was "fully satisfied that [the verdict] has
made the plaintiffs whole." The court noted the testimony of an I. Magnin officer
who referred to plaintiff Ritter as a "cancer." I. Magnin's numerous attacks during
the trial on plaintiffs' abilities support the trial judge's conclusion that plaintiffs and
I. Magnin could no longer "[c]oexist in a business relationship that could be productive to the consumer, community or the business itself."
Id. at 1319-20.
110. See supra note 3.
Ill. See Staklinski v. Pyramid Elec. Co., 6 N.Y.2d 159, 160 N.E.2d 78, 188 N.Y.S.2d
541 (1950). See also Colvig v. RKO Gen., Inc., 232 Cal. App. 2d 56, 42 Cal. Rptr. 473
(1965).
112. 6 N.Y.2d 159, 160 N.F.2d 78, 188 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1950).
113. Id. at 163, 160 N.E.2d at 79, 188 N.Y.S.2d at 542.
114. 449 So. 2d 1147 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
115. Id. at 1149.
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The lower court found that the father was wrongfully terminated and that the incidents upon which the sons relied to establish

cause for the termination were minor. 116 In reviewing the record, the
appellate court agreed with the lower court.11

7

The appellate court

affirmed the trial court's order of specific performance and ordered
the father reinstated to his former position as well as the award of
back pay and benefits as damages for the breach.' 1 8

In Ellis v. Glover and Gardner Construction Co.,"19 an employee who was terminated because of a wage garnishment brought
suit alleging that the termination violated the Federal Consumer
Credit Protection Act.' 20 The defendant maintained that Ellis had
been terminated because of alcoholism, poor job performance, insubordination, and dishonesty. However, the separation notice stated:
"This man was discharged do [sic] to his wages being garnishee
[sic]-it is a company policy to discharge any employee this happens
[to]. ' ' 121 Ellis sought reinstatement, backpay, and other relief. The
court's interpretation of the statute held reinstatement to be an ap116. Id.at 1152.
117. The appellate court stated:
Our review of the record convinces us that the plaintiff was hired primarily to supervise and advise, due to his expertise and extensive experience in wireline work. Although the plaintiff stated that he considered sales a part of his job duties, it appears that such work was not envisioned as a primary function of the plaintiff when
he signed the employment contract. We find support for this proposition in the testimony regarding the amendment of the contract at the time it was signed. At the
insistence of Guy Duhon, the contract was amended to show that supervision on jobs
would be considered a part of the plaintiff's job duties. This testimony evidences a
concern on the part of Guy Duhon with more precisely defining the plaintiff's job
duties. The absence of any mention of sales work leads us to believe that, if it was
intended that the plaintiff do sales work, such intention was not a primary consideration in the negotiation of the employment contract. Thus, the defendants' suggestion that the alleged failure of the plaintiff to do sales work constitutes a blanket
refusal to perform his duties is not supported by the record.
It is also important to observe that the plaintiff held a position of authority with
Slickline, Inc. While we may disagree with the position taken by the plaintiff on the
issue of his son's beard, the record makes clear that the plaintiff, by virtue of his
position, was entitled to have some input into policy-making, a function apparently
shared with his sons. Thus, the plaintiff's strong stand on the issue, in our view is
not in the nature of insubordination, but rather a policy conflict with those with
whom he shared authority.
Id. at 1152.
118. Id. at 1153. A party who establishes a breach of his employment contract due to
wrongful dismissal, is entitled to either damages or specific performance of the contract, or to
dissolution of the contract. In all these cases, the plaintiff is entitled to damages where they
accrue. Id. (citations omitted).
119. 562 F. Supp. 1054 (M.D. Tenn. 1983).
120. 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1982).
121. Ellis, 562 F. Supp. at 1056.
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propriate remedy,12 2 and analogized it to the area of employment

discrimination.123
In Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet,2 4 a management level employee with no contract was reinstated following a wrongful termina-

tion.125 In analyzing Brockmeyer's claim the court discussed the
need to distinguish between cases sounding in tort and cases sound-

ing in contract when basing a decision on the public policy excep122.

Id. at 1066
It appears to this Court that under Section 1674(a) reinstatement is implicitly
available to the private plaintiff and that back pay should follow as a matter of
course. The administrative remedies used by the Secretary of Labor to enforce Section 1674(a) include civil actions to compel the employer to reinstate a discharged
employee and to pay back pay. . . Moreover, the very considerations leading this
Court to conclude that Congress intended to allow suits by private individuals indicate that Congress intended reinstatement and backpay to be available in order to
make wrongfully discharged members of the protected class whole.
Id. (citations omitted).
123. Id. at 1066-67.
In the field of employment discrimination, by way of analogy, reinstatement
and back pay are required in order to make the plaintiff whole for past injuries
suffered as result of the unlawful discrimination. (citations omitted) The employment discrimination cases under Title VII are instructive because, in the face of
rather vague statutory language, the courts have had to develop a standard of discretion that will effectuate the legislation's purpose . . . To deny reinstatement
and back pay in the instant case would appear, to this Court, unjustifiable in light of
Section 1674(a)'s central purpose of protecting a particular class of debtor-employees from discharge by reason of garnishment.
Id.
124. 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983).
125. The facts and circumstances leading up to the plaintiff's discharge were as follows:
[His immediate superiors] were informed that Brockmeyer, who was married but
separated, was vacationing in Montana with his secretary when it was believed that
he was performing his normal duties as district manager. Additional inquiries revealed that Brockmeyer had also smoked marijuana in the presence of company
personnel. . .. [S]upervisory personnel were directed to confront Brockmeyer with
the information received to resolve the problem. [Brockmeyer] acknowledged the
relationship with his secretary. He apologized for his absenteeism without notice.
He admitted smoking marijuana and promised not to do it again.
Brockmeyer was firmly told that he would be terminated or reassigned if existing conditions did not improve. Shortly thereafter, Brockmeyer's former secretary
filed a sex discrimination claim against Dun & Bradstreet. On a variety of separate
occasions, Brockmeyer was asked by his superiors to submit a written report about
the course of events which led to her resignation. Brockmeyer refused because he
feared he would become Dun & Bradstreet's scapegoat for the alleged discrimination actions taken against his former secretary. He also indicated that if called to
testify at a hearing or trial, he would tell the truth.
Dun & Bradstreet settled the claim with Brockmeyer's former secretary. Three
days later, Brockmeyer was terminated. At the time of the termination, he was offered $8,500 if he would sign a release agreeing not to sue Dun & Bradstreet.
Brockmeyer refused the offer and initiated a wrongful termination action.
Id. at _ 335 N.W.2d at 836.
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tion.' 26 This concept for determining the availability of a reinstatement remedy has been supported by other cases. 2
Reinstatement is available in common law tort actions as a form
of injunctive relief.1 28 Although the availability of injunctive relief in
torts depends on a variety of factors,' 29 it is foreseeable that courts,

when faced by requests for orders to reinstate employees in the pub126.

The court stated:
Whether the cause of action for wrongful discharge should be maintained in
tort or contract or both needs to be resolved . . . . Those cases implying a contractual term of good faith dealing sounded in contract. Most, though not all of the
public policy exception cases from other states were tort actions . . . . The most
significant distinction in our view between the two causes of action in wrongful discharge suits is in the damages that may be recovered. In tort actions, the only limitations are those of "proximate cause" or public policy considerations. Punitive
damages are also allowed. In contract actions, damages are limited by the concepts
of foreseability and mitigation. The remedies established by the majority of Wisconsin wrongful discharge statutes are limited to reinstatement and backpay, contractual remedy concepts. We believe that reinstatement and backpay are the most
appropriate remedies for public policy exception wrongful discharges since the primary concern in these actions is to make the wronged employee "whole." Therefore,
we conclude that a contract action is most appropriate for wrongful discharges
. . . . The contract action is essentially predicated on the breach of an implied provision that an employer will not discharge an employee for refusing to perform an
act that violates a clear mandate of public policy. Tort actions cannot be
maintained.
Id. at 574, 335 N.W.2d at 841.
127. See, e.g., Jerry Dvorak v. Pluswood Wisconsin, Inc., 121 Wis. 2d 199, 358 N.W.2d
544 (1984). In Dvorak, the court stated:
Our decision in this case is consistent with Brockmeyer. In that case, our supreme court held that an employee has a cause of action for wrongful discharge only
when the discharge is contrary to public policy. The supreme court reached this
decision by implying a public policy provision into all employment contracts. The
supreme court concluded that a breach of the implied provision created a contract
action, rather than a tort action. The court specifically rejected the argument that a
wrongful discharge can be maintained as a tort action; the court held that contract
damages, especially backpay and reinstatement, are the appropriate remedies for
breach of an employment contract.
Id. at _ 335 N.W.2d at 545-46. (citations omitted).
128. Injunctive relief, as used in the Restatement includes both mandatory and prohibitory injunctions. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 48, Note on Terminology (1977).
129. Some of these factors can be found in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 936
(1977) and are as follows:
(a) the nature of the interest to be protected,
(b) the relative adequacy to the plaintiff of injunction and of other remedies,
(c) any unreasonable delay by the plaintiff in bringing suit,
(d) any related misconduct on the part of the plaintiff,
(e) the relative hardship likely to result to defendant if an injunction is granted
and to plaintiff if it is denied,
(f) the interests of third persons and of the public, and
(g) the practicability of framing and enforcing the order or judgment.
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lic policy tort context, may order reinstatement.1 30
From these cases, it is evident that the reinstatement remedy is
no longer refused outright. Depending upon the particular case's
facts, a wrongfully terminated employee may compel a court to order reinstatement.
D. Towards a Comprehensive Rationalefor Awarding
Reinstatement as a Remedy for Wrongful Termination Under a
Handbook or Written Employment Policy
In light of the arbitration and administrative remedies arising
under collective bargaining agreements, reinstatement may be a successful remedy for an employer's breach of a handbook or employment policy. It is suggested that a handbook or a printed employment policy is comparable to a collective bargaining agreement in
that it establishes such items as work rules, discipline policies, wages
and fringe benefits.
An employee's right to employment, a contractual right based
on the collective bargaining agreement, is of paramount importance.131 Where an arbitrator under a collective bargaining agreement finds that a termination was not for "just cause," a traditional
part of the remedy has been reinstatement.3 2
An arbitrator's reinstatement order was a very fundamental
change in the United States labor relations system after enactment
of the National Labor Relations Act. Collective bargaining agreements enforced through arbitration clauses became an almost universal part of the employer-union relationship under the stimulus of the
War Labor Board established during World War II.131 Today, little
doubt remains about the authority of an arbitrator to direct reinstatement as the remedy for a wrongful termination, and like any
other arbitration awards, they are enforceable in the courts. 3
130.

See, e.g., Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834

(1983).
131.
132.

133.
134.

J.l. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
See Reece v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 340 F. Supp. 695 (W.D. Va. 1972).
0. FAIRWEATHER, supra note 10, at 500.

[A]rbitration is the substitute for industrial strife .

. .

.[I]t is part and parcel

of the collective bargaining process itself.
The collective bargaining agreement states the rights and duties of the parties.

It is more than a contract; it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which
the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate. (citation omitted) The collective agreement
covers the whole employment relationship. It calls into being a new common
law-the common law of a particular industry or of a particular plant . ...

A collective bargaining agreement is an effort to erect a system of industrial
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Most collective bargaining agreements in the private and public
sectors do, in fact, require a "cause" or "just cause" standard for
termination or other discipline. Where this standard is not expressed
in a collective bargaining agreement, many arbitrators imply a "just
cause" limitation.135 The general significance of the terms "cause" or
self-government. . .. [T]he grievance machinery under a collective bargaining
agreement is at the very heart of the system of industrial self-government. Arbitration is the means of solving the unforeseeable by molding a system of private law for
all the problems which may arise and to provide for their solution in a way which
will generally accord with the variant needs and desires of the parties. The processing of disputes through the grievance machinery is actually a vehicle by which
meaning an content are given to the collective bargaining agreement ...
"A proper conception of the arbitrator's function is basic. He is not a
public tribunal imposed upon the parties by superior authority which the parties are obliged to accept. He has no general charter to administer justice for
a community which transcends the parties. He is rather part of a system of
self-government created by and confined to the parties.***" (citation
omitted)
The labor arbitrator performs functions which are not normal to the courts; the
considerations which help him fashion judgments may indeed be foreign to the competence of courts . . . . The labor arbitrator is usually chosen because of the parties' confidence in his knowledge of the common law of the shop and their trust in
his personal judgment to bring to bear considerations which are not expressed in the
contract as criteria for judgment. The parties expect that his judgment of a particular grievance will reflect not only what the contract says but, insofar as the collective bargaining agreement permits, such factors as the effect upon productivity of a
particular result, its consequence to the morale of the shop, his judgment whether
tensions will be heightened or diminished. For the parties' objective in using the
arbitration process is primarily to further their common goal of uninterrupted production under the agreement, to make the agreement serve their specialized needs.
The ablest judge cannot be expected to bring the same experience and competence
to bear upon the determination of a grievance, because he cannot be similarly
informed.
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578-82 (1960).
In Chester City School Authority v. Aberthaw Constr. Co., 460 Pa. 343, 333 A.2d 758
(1975), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that "[s]ettlements of disputes by arbitration
are no longer deemed contrary to public policy. In fact, our statutes encourage arbitration and
with our dockets crowded and in some jurisdictions congested, arbitration is favored by the
Courts." Id. at 352, 333 A.2d at 763.
135. For instance, Arbitrator Walter E. Boles held that "a 'just cause' basis for consideration of disciplinary action is, absent a clear proviso to the contrary, implied in a modern
collective bargaining agreement." Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 25 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 295, 301
(1955) (Boles, Pennington, and Hampton, Arbs.).
Another arbitrator gave this reason:
If the Company can discharge without cause, it can lay off without cause. It can
recall, transfer, or promote in violation of the seniority provisions simply by invoking
its claimed right to discharge. Thus, to interpret the Agreement in accord with the
claim of the Company would reduce to a nullity the fundamental provision of a
labor-management agreement-the security of a worker in his job.
Atwater Mfg. Co., 13 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 747, 749 (1949) (Donnelly, Sviridoff, and Clark,
Arbs.).
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"just cause" was highlighted by Arbitrator Joseph D. McGoldrick"3 '
and may be comprised of any number of factors.1"7
Many collective bargaining agreements also contain progressive
discipline clauses. These impose a kind of procedural due process

through an escalating series of disciplinary steps before termination
may be imposed. 8 8 Even if progressive discipline is not explicitly re-

quired, collective bargaining agreements frequently enumerate "car136. [l]t is common to include the right to suspend and discharge for "just cause,"
"justifiable cause," "proper cause," . . . or quite commonly simply for "cause."
There is no significant difference between these various phrases. These exclude discharge for mere whim or caprice. They are, obviously, intended to include those
things for which employees have traditionally been fired. They include the traditional causes of discharge in the particular trade or industry, the practices which
develop in the day-to-day relations of management and labor and most recently they
include the decisions of courts and arbitrators. They represent a growing body of
"common law" that may be regarded either as the latest development of the law of
"master and servant" or, perhaps more properly as part of a new body of common
law of "Management and labor under collective bargaining agreements." They constitute the duties owed by employees to management and, in their correlative aspect,
are part of the rights of management. They include such duties as honesty, punctuality, sobriety, or conversely, the right to discharge for theft, repeated absence or
lateness, destruction of company property, brawling and the like. Where they are
not expressed in posted rules, they may very well be implied, provided they are
applied in a uniform, non-discriminatory manner.
Worthington Corp., 24 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1, 6-7 (1955) (McGoldrick, Sutton and Tribble,
Arbs.).
137. Some of the factors to be considered are as follows:
(a) The "law of the shop," that is, the response by an employer over a period of
years and in a consistent manner to a particular offense.
(b) A consistent pattern of enforcement of rules and regulations and of notifying
employees as to the existence of those rules;
(c) Case histories of other incidents of enforcement;
(d) Known practices of severe discipline for certain offenses because of the potential for harm from the product or the manufacturing process;
(e) Offenses that call for immediate suspension and those not requiring removal;
(f) On-premises and off-premises offenses, and the differences in their treatment;
(g) General "arbitral authority," derived from publication of awards, articles, etc.;
(h) The arbitrator's own sense of equity and his/her subjective judgment as to the
significance, seriousness and weight to be given to the incident involved, the
record of the employee, or the circumstances causing the termination;
(i) The severity of the case's facts;
(j) Attempts made by the employer to rehabilitate the employee;
(k) Progressive discipline steps that may or may not have been taken;
(I) The discipline penalty imposed as it relates to the case's facts;
(m) Whether a "second chance" is warranted from the employee's prior record;
and
(n) Whether the employee is unreclaimable as indicated by his or her prior record
and the facts of the case.
For a general discussion of "cause" and "just cause" see F. ELKOURI & E.A. ELKOURI,

How ARBITRATION WORKS 611-13 (3d ed. 1973).
138. F. ELKOURI & E.A. ELKOURI, supra note 137, at 630.
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dinal sins" for which no prior warning is necessary before an employer terminates the employee. Employees committing lesser "sins"
are subject to progressive discipline. Among the most common "cardinal sins" are dishonesty, insubordination, using drugs or drinking
alcohol while on duty, fighting, using company vehicles without permission, and possessing firearms on company property. Other misconduct of equal magnitude will also justify termination for cause. 130
The ultimate penalty that can be imposed for wrongdoing is termination. Lesser penalties may include warnings and suspensions.
Termination is recognized as the extreme industrial penalty because
the employee's job, contractual benefits, and future employability are
at stake. 140 In termination cases, the burden almost always is on the
employer to prove wrongdoing, and always so where the agreement
requires just cause for termination. The quantum of required proof,
141
however, is an unsettled issue.
Reinstatement and back pay together constitute a major sanction for enforcement of the National Labor Relations Act, state labor relations acts, discrimination laws, and collective bargaining
agreements. Probably nothing is as effective in discouraging a spurious or capricious employee termination. The employer is always
aware that it may have to reinstate the employee with backpay in
addition to incurring the trouble and expense of arbitration, court
action, or an administrative proceeding, unless the termination is justified. Reinstatement and/or a back-pay bill may constitute a considerable sum.
Awarding the same remedy for wrongful terminations occurring
under a handbook or an employment policy breach may result in the
same employer constraint. This is especially appropriate where handbooks and employment policies have been considered binding employer commitments.142 Under these circumstances, handbooks and
139.
140.
141.
142.

Genuine Parts Co., 79 Lab Arb. (BNA) 220, 224 (1982) (Reed, Arb.).
Stylemaster, Inc., 79 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 76, 77-78 (1982) (Winton, Arb.).
J. REDEKER, DISCIPLINE: POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 55-251 (1983).
See cases cited supra note 31. Throughout the remainder of the industrial world,

reinstatement is considered as a viable remedy. The reports of the 10th International Congress
of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security indicated the following regard,ing employment termination and the reinstatement remedy:
Most effective is the reinstatement of the employee. There may be various
terms used to identify this remedy. However, they all translate into the same idea;

the discharge lacks all effect because the labor contract continues its course.
We must differentiate between reinstatement and re-engagement. The latter

connotes the celebration of a new contract, with the effect that there exists a lapse
between the original and subsequent contracts. British legislation affords both reinstatement and re-engagement as remedies.
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employment policies are equivalent to a collective bargaining agree-

ment. A "just cause" standard can likewise be implied and reinstatement ordered as an appropriate remedy.

IV. A

"FAIRNESS"

RATIONALE FOR DEALING WITH

EMPLOYMENT TERMINATIONS TO LIMIT A REINSTATEMENT REMEDY

Because the area of at will employment is undergoing massive
changes, employers are advised to take some general preventive measures to prevent a reinstatement remedy. Although most jurisdictions
have not gone as far as California has in drastically circumscribing
the at will employment relationship,'4 3 the trend has been for courts
to grant reinstatement and employers are well advised to "act as if"
their terminations and other personnel decisions will be held to the
most restrictive standards. Even if the employer is operating in a
nonunion setting, every termination should be treated as if subject to
labor arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement. An employer should be prepared to meet a "just cause" standard for every
There is an issue as to whether "restitution" may be equally accomplished by
reinstatement or simply by payment of the employee's salary notwithstanding his
absence. This problem has particular significance where an employer wishes to discharge an employee for union activity. The employer may wish to continue payment
of the employee's salary so long as that employee does not contact his fellow workers. After vacillation somewhat, Italian law looks with disfavor upon the attempt to
force reinstatement. Obviously, what is sought is the effective reinstatement of the
worker and not simply the payment of a salary.
Small firms. Some laws have set forth that reinstatement is not available
against small firms (Peru and Sweden).
Eliminated jobs. Reinstatement may not be possible because the company has
ceased to exist, or the position has been eliminated. In Romania, the employee
maintains his rights as if he had continued on the job. In Great Britain, the employee must be indemnified for his losses. Moreover, where the employer cites incompatibility as an obstacle to reinstatement, the employer must pay twice the normal indemnification and give a 90 day prior notice to the worker.
Exercise of the right. In some countries, the employee may proceed to seek
reinstatement once there has been a decision that the discharge was unjustified
(Fed. Rep. Germany, Italy, Norway, Paraguay, Romania, Spain, and Sweden).
Other countries provide reinstatement as a judicially-imposed remedy, left to the
discretion of the judge, to be decided on a case-by-case basis (Brazil, Columbia,
Great Britain, India, Israel, Japan, Morocco, Norway, Turkey, and U.S.).
Option. There are countries that provide employers with the option of indemnification as an alternative to reinstatement (Great Britain, Italy, Sweden, Spain).
Although a discharged employee may have the right to be reinstated, he may elect
otherwise (Brazil, Czechoslovakia, Fed. Rep. Germany, and Italy).
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL SECURITY, REPORTS AND PROCEED-

INGS, 1I EMPLOYMENT TERMINATIONS

105-06 (B. Aaron & D. Farwell eds. 1984).

143. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981);
Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., Ill Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980). Tameny
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
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adverse employee action taken. In this way, the employer will be
better able to defend its actions and minimize the chances of any
reinstatement order.
Fair treatment of employees will go a long way to minimize this
risk. Many employees sue because they believe they have been unfairly treated. Employers should take steps to soften the financial
blow of a termination. Conduct that might be perceived as humiliating, such as public statements about employee performance should
be avoided. The employer should always act to preserve the dignity
and respect of the employee.
Termination of the employee should never be a hasty decision.
Even if a business judgment has been made that a formal documentation/performance evaluation system would be inappropriate, progressive discipline should still be used. Written warnings should be
issued, the affected employee should acknowledge in writing receipt
of any warnings, and opportunities for employee rehabilitation
should be afforded. Where an employer can document that progressive discipline was provided and rehabilitation was sincerely attempted, a court may be less likely to view the case in the employee's favor and award reinstatement.
If an internal grievance system exists, it should be available to
all. If more than one employee is guilty of the same offense, an employer should not discriminate among them when disciplining, unless
strong business reasons exist for the distinctions. A detailed documentation for any disciplinary action is essential. These efforts will
decrease the possibility of a reinstatement order.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

The foregoing examination of the reinstatement remedy has
presented an analysis with suggestions for employers to conduct their
affairs in order to avoid reinstatement orders by the judiciary. Until
the final impact of the limitations on at will employment is assessed,
employers are advised to keep abreast of any changes that occur in
their employment procedures. Failure to do so may result in costly
litigation and increased exposure to damages, including possible
reinstatement.

Increasingly, courts are finding that handbooks and employment
policies may become binding employer commitments. Courts will be
asked to treat the remedy of reinstatement as arbitrators have been
using it under collective bargaining agreements. Employers must
prepare now for the increased use of reinstatement by realistically
reviewing their internal employment practices.
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